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In Babin v. Babin,l the plaintiff had built a house with her separate
funds on separate property of her husband with his apparent consent;
following their divorce, she demanded the full value of the house. Despite
its detailed regulation of similar situations involving community funds, 2
community land,3 and common labor, 4 the matrimonial regimes law
contained no provision dealing with improvements of separate property
of one spouse made with the separate funds of the other spouse. Thus
the court had to turn to the general law of accession and, applying
pre-1979 law, granted the plaintiff's request.' As explained in last year's
property symposium article, had the court applied post-1979 accession
law as it probably should have done, 6 it would have encountered another
gap as, the Civil Code contained no provision regulating the fate of
buildings built on the land of another with his consent, after such
consent terminated.7 Act 933 of 1984 filled both gaps by amending the
relevant provisions of the Civil Code on accession and on matrimonial
regimes. This article is devoted exclusively to Act 933 and discusses
separately the two sets of amendments.
AMENDMENT OF THE GENERAL LAW OF AcCESSION
The Gap in the Pre-1984 Law of Accession
Under article 493, "[b]uildings, other constructions permanently at-
tached to the ground, and plantings made on the land of another with
his consent belong to him who made them. They belong to the owner
Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 433 So. 2d 225 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), discussed in Symeonides, Developments
in the Law, 1982-1983-Property, 44 La. L. Rev. 503, 519-21 (1983).
2. See La. Civ. Code art. 2366 (providing for improvements of separate property
made with community funds). All articles referred to herein without further designation
are articles of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 as revised through the 1983 legislative
session. Articles revised by Act 933 of 1984 are referred to hereinafter as "new articles."
3. See La. Civ. Code art. 2367 (providing for improvement of community property
made with separate funds).
4. See La. Civ. Code art. 2368 (providing for improvement of separate property as
a result of the uncompensated common labor of the spouses).
5. See Symeonides, supra note 1, at 519-20.
6. See id. at 519 n.86.
7. See id. at 520-22 (explaining the gap) and id. at 522-27 (suggesting six alternate
ways of filling the gap).
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of the ground when they are made without his consent." ' Unlike
improvements9 made without the landowner's consent, which, according
to the same article, belong to the landowner 0 and which are regulated
in detail by subsequent articles," the Civil Code contained no provision
regulating the fate of improvements made with the landowner's consent
after such consent terminates. When the relationship between the land-
owner and the person who made the improvements [hereinafter referred
to as a "consensual builder"] is based on an express contract, the
contract may contain provisions regulating the fate of the improvements
after its expiration. Very often, however, the contract may be silent on
the question, 2 or there may be no contract at all, as in Babin and
other cases where the parties are related by affinity, consanguinity, or
friendship which seems to them to obviate the need for a formal contract."
When the relationship runs into difficulties, a dispute over the improve-
ments is likely to arise for which the Civil Code provided no direct
solution. Short of legislative intervention, the gap could be filled only
by analogical interpretation of articles 495, 496, 497, or 670, or by
8. After the revision of 1979, the full text of article 493 read as follows:
Buildings, other constructions permanently attached to the ground, and plant-
ings made on the land of another with his consent belong to him who made
them. They belong to the owner of the ground when they are made without
his consent.
Things incorporated in, or attached to, an immovable so as to become its
component parts under Articles 465 and 466 belong to the owner of the im-
movable.
One who lost the ownership of a thing to the owner of an immovable may
have a claim against him or against a third person in accordance with the
following provisions.
9. The term "improvement" is used herein to denote collectively "buildings, other
constructions permanently attached to the ground, and plantings."
10. See the second sentence of the first paragraph of article 493, quoted supra note
8.
11. See La. Civ. Code arts. 493 1 3 (now appearing as new La. Civ. Code art.
493.2), 496, 497, 498.
12. Before its amendment by Act 933, article 2726 purported to provide a limited
solution to the more frequent disputes between lessors and lessees by cross-reference to
article 493. The cross-reference was incorrect and was instead meant to be a reference to
article 495. However, as explained later in this Article, see infra text accompanying notes
19-21, article 495 is a narrower provision, dealing only with "component parts . . . under
Articles 465 and 466," i.e., building materials, plumbing materials, electrical installations
and the like rather than with whole "buildings, other constructions . . . or plantings."
For these latter improvements neither article 495 nor the erroneously referred to article
493 provided a solution. Act 933 fills the gap by amending article 493, see infra note
15, and by correcting the cross-references contained in article 2726, which now refer to
new articles 493, 493.1, 493.2, and 495.
13. See, e.g., Falgoust v. Inness, 163 So. 429 (La. App. Orl. 1935) (landowner allowed
her son-in-law to erect a gas station on her land).
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resorting to the general principle of unjust enrichment.' 4 Act 933 fills
the gap by adding the following paragraph to article 493.1
When the owner of buildings, other constructions permanently
attached to the ground, or plantings no longer has the right to
keep them on the land of another, he may remove them subject
to his obligation to restore the property to its former condition.
If he does not remove them within 90 days after written demand,
the owner of the land acquires ownership of the improvements
and owes nothing to their former owner.
Although this language is self-explanatory, it raises some questions
of fairness which may be answered by comparing the article with other
provisions of the Civil Code regulating the rights of persons similarly
situated. Such a comparison may also help to clarify some ambiguities
in these other provisions. The comparison centers on three themes: the
builder's right of voluntary removal of the improvements; the land-
owner's right to force removal at the expense of the builder; and the
landowner's obligation to reimburse the builder in case the improvements
are not or cannot be removed. For the convenience of the reader, a
chart depicting the operation of the pertinent Civil Code articles appears
at the end of this paper.
14. See Symeonides, supra note 1, at 523-27.
15. The full text of the new article 493 reads as follows:
Buildings, other constructions permanently attached to the ground, and plant-
ings made on the land of another with his consent belong to him who made
them. They belong to the owner of the ground when they are made without
his consent.
When the owner of buildings, other constructions permanently attached to
the ground, or plantings no longer has the right to keep them on the land of
another, he may remove them subject to his obligation to restore the property
to its former condition. If he does not remove them within 90 days after written
demand, the owner of the land acquires ownership of the improvements and
owes nothing to their former owner.
When buildings, of [sic] other constructions permanently attached to the
ground, or of [sic] plantings are made on the separate property of a spouse
with community assets or with separate assets of the other spouse and when
such improvements are made on community property with the separate assets
of a spouse, this Article does not apply. The rights of the spouse are governed
by Articles 2366, 2367, and 2367.1.
The word "of" preceding "sic" in paragraph 3 of this code article is an obvious
typographical error and should be disregarded. As is evident by comparing this text with
the text of former article 493, quoted supra note 8, the first paragraph remains unchanged
while the last two paragraphs are new. The last two paragraphs of former article 493
are redesignated without change as new articles 493.1 and 493.2 respectively. The third
paragraph of new article 493 also makes clear that a Babin-type situation will no longer
be governed by the general law of accession. See infra text accompanying notes 57, 58
& 64-66.
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Comparison with Article 495
Article 49516 is similar to the part of new article 493 under discussion
here 7 in that both articles deal with precarious possessors making im-
provements on another's immovable with his consent. 8 However, unlike
new article 493 which deals with "buildings, other constructions per-
manently attached to the ground, or plantings"' 9 all of which retain
their separate identity despite their attachment to the ground, article 495
deals with component parts "under Articles 465 and 466, ' ' 20 i.e., things
incorporated into or attached permanently to an immovable in such a
way as to become, either in a physical ot in a functional sense, an
integral part of the immovable. 2' Because of this close degree of inte-
gration, the law does not allow ownership of these component parts
separate from the ownership of the immovable. 22 This is so regardless
of whether these component parts were attached to the immovable with
the consent of its owner, 23 who acquires ownership of these component
parts by mere virtue of their incorporation into or attachment to his
immovable. His ownership is only nominal, however, in those cases in
which he consented to the attachments, since he cannot prevent the
16. Civil Code article 495 reads as follows:
One who incorporates in, or attaches to the immovable of another, with his
consent, things that become component parts of the immovable under Articles
465 and 466, may, in the absence of other provisions of law or juridical acts,
remove them subject to his obligation of restoring the property to its former
condition.
If he does not remove them after demand, the owner of the immovable may
have them removed at the expense of the person who made them or elect to
keep them and pay, at his option, the current value of the materials and of
the workmanship or the enhanced value of the immovable.
17. The part of new article 493 under discussion here is the second paragraph of
the article; it will be referred to hereinafter as "new article 493."
18. Because of this similarity the redactors of the 1979 revision initially drafted a
single article to cover both situations. See the text of this article and discussion in
Symeonides, supra note 1, at 521-22.
19. New La. Civ. Code art. 493, quoted supra note 15.
20. La. Civ. Code art. 495, quoted supra note 16.
21. Civil Code article 465 deals with things such as building materials which are
"incorporated into a tract of land, a building, or other construction, so as to become
an integral part of it." Civil Code article 466 deals with "[t]hings permanently attached
to a building . .. such as plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical or other installations."
These things may or may not be integrated into the building in a physical sense, but are
nevertheless viewed by society as functionally constituting a part of the whole building.
22. "Things incorporated in, or attached to, an immovable so as to become its
component parts under Articles 465 and 466 belong to the owner of the immovable."
La. Civ. Code art. 493 xP 2 (now appearing as new article 493.1). See La. Civ. Code
art. 493, comment (d), as enacted in 1979. See also La. R.S. 9:5357 (1983) for a statutory
exception for things subject to a chattel mortgage.
23. See supra note 22, and a contrario reasoning from article 493, first paragraph.
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builder from unilaterally removing them. Despite some ambiguity, 24 this
is the proper interpretation of article 495, which thus accords the builder
the same right of unilaterally removing improvements as does new article
493. This right becomes important in cases where both parties want the
improvements. In both situations the builder prevails. The 493 builder
enjoys this right as a direct consequence of his ownership of the im-
provements. The 495 builder enjoys this right, despite his non-ownership
of the improvements, because of considerations of equity and avoiding
unjust enrichment. Whether as a practical matter the two builders enjoy
the same facility of removal is a different question. 25
The rights of the two builders differ in those cases in which they
do not voluntarily remove the improvements. In both situations the ball
lands in the landowner's court, but his rights differ. Under article 495
the owner of the immovable may either force the removal of the im-
provements at the expense of the builder, or choose to keep them and
pay the builder reimbursement. Under new article 493, on the other
hand, the landowner does not have the right to force removal at the
builder's expense, but acquires ownership of the improvement without
any obligation of reimbursement should the builder not remove the
improvements "within 90 days after written demand." The fairness of
the new provision depends on such factors as the facility and cost of
removing the improvements, their bulk, and their relative value to the
two parties. Although many combinations are possible, it seems that in
the case of improvements which are valueless, yet costly to remove, the
landowner is at the mercy of the builder, since he cannot force removal
at the builder's expense. But in the case of valuable but physically
inseparable improvements, the landowner is unjustly enriched since he
acquires ownership of the improvements without having to pay reim-
bursement.
24. The ambiguity results from the fact that the two paragraphs of article 495, see
supra note 16, seem to grant to the two parties rights which, when exercised simultaneously,
are in direct conflict. The first paragraph gives the builder the right to remove the
attachments, while the second paragraph gives the owner of the immovable the right to
keep the improvements and pay the reimbursement specified therein. If both wish to
exercise their rights, a conflict is unavoidable unless the two rights are ranked one way
or the other. The fact that under the second paragraph of article 493 (now new article
493.1) the owner of the immovable owns these improvements suggests that he should be
able to keep them if he so wishes, and that only if he chooses not to keep them or does
not pay the reimbursement should the builder be allowed to remove them. Nevertheless,
the way article 495 is arranged suggests that the redactors intended the opposite solution:
the builder has the first option of removing improvements, and only if he does not or
cannot exercise his option does the owner of the immovable get to exercise his options.
25. The facility of removal depends on the degree of integration and the bulk and
value of the improvements. Although there are infinite variations, it usually is easier to
remove air conditioners or chandeliers than whole buildings.
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It is certainly not a satisfactory answer to these problems to say
that they can be avoided if the parties take care to agree on the fate
of the improvements in advance-the reason for enacting the new pro-
vision was to provide for situations Which the parties failed to regulate
by contract. Nor is it a satisfactory answer to say that a builder who
makes valuable improvements on the land of another without providing
for ways to recoup his investment deserves no sympathy, and that the
landowner should not bear the burden of the builder's imprudence. The
principle of unjust enrichment, which permeates all the other pertinent
articles on accession, 26 has little to do with the prudence or imprudence
of the impoverishee. If anything, it is "imprudent" parties who are the
most likely beneficiaries of the principle of unjust enrichment. In fact,
even the "moral standing" of the impoverishee is not very relevant for
purposes of unjust enrichment, as is evident from articles 486, 497 and
527,27 which provide for reimbursement to the bad-faith possessor despite
his bad faith and his knowledge that he is dealing with the land of
another. What triggers the application of the doctrine of unjust enrich-
ment is an enrichment, causally linked to the impoverishment, for which
there is no "justification," i.e., which is not "the result of, or finds
its explanation in, the terms of a valid juridical act between the im-
poverishee . . . and the enrichee." ' 2s It seems that the predicament of
the 493 builder meets all those requirements for invoking the doctrine
of unjust enrichement. 29 In making this doctrine inapplicable, new article
493 is in sharp contrast with the surrounding articles of the Civil Code,
including article 495. Article 495, which also applies only "in the absence
of other provisions of . . . juridical acts" avoids these inequities by
not placing the parties in positions from which they can blackmail each
other. Article 495 is more equitable in that it enables the landowner to
force removal of improvements he does not want, but also requires him
to pay for improvements that he wants and which enhance the value
of his property.
26. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 485 (providing for reimbursement of production
costs to the person with whose work fruits belonging to the landowner have been produced),
486 (providing that the good-faith possessor is entitled to reimbursement for fruits he
was unable to gather due to his eviction by the owner, and that the bad-faith possessor
is entitled to reimbursement for fruits he restores to the owner), 495 (discussed in text),
496-497 (discussed infra text accompanying notes 32-37), 527 (providing that both the
good-faith and the bad-faith possessors are entitled to reimbursement for "necessary
expenses").
27. See id.
28. Edmonston v. A-Second Mortgage Co., 289 So. 2d 116, 122 (La. 1974).
29. It may be countered that the enrichment is "the result of, or finds its explanation
in" the agreement between the landowner and the builder about the making of the
improvements. This agreement, however, does not provide either expressly or by clear
implication for the fate of the improvements after termination of consent. If the agreement
does provide otherwise, then the article is inapplicable. See La. Civ. Code art. 493,
comment (c).
[Vol. 45
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Comparison with Possessors
It may be helpful to recall at the outset that by definition a possessor,
whether in good or bad faith, does not have the consent of the landowner
to possess the land,30 much less to make improvements thereon. Thus,
unlike the improvements made by a consensual builder, any improve-
ments made by a possessor belong to the landowner" and cannot, strictly
speaking, be removed without his permission. Although articles 496 and
497 are silent on the question, this seems to be a direct consequence
of the fact that the improvements belong to the landowner. This precept
applies equally to both the good-faith and the bad-faith possessor,
although the former may, as a practical matter, secure such permission
more easily than the latter.3
2
In all other respects possessors are treated differently depending on
their good or bad faith, and the good-faith possessor may in some cases
be treated better than the consensual builder. For, unlike the consensual
builder who risks losing the improvements without reimbursement unless
he is able to remove them within 90 days, the good-faith possessor risks
little. Although he cannot unilaterally remove the improvements, neither
can he be forced to do so. Not only is the landowner "bound to keep
them," 33 but also, despite his "ownership" of the improvements, he
must reimburse the good-faith possessor "either the cost of the materials
and of the workmanship, or. their current value, or the enhanced value
of the immovable." 3 4 Although the option of choosing from these three
kinds of reimbursement rests with the landowner, who is likely to choose
the least expensive, the good-faith possessor still gets something35 and
is thus better off than the consensual builder who gets nothing for
improvements he cannot remove. The better treatment of the good-faith
possessor in this respect is justified since, unlike the consensual builder,
he has no way to protect hirmself because, at the time he makes the
improvements, he is justifiably unaware of his lack of ownership of the
ground.
30. The intent to possess the thing for oneself is an essential ingredient of the concept
of possession. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3421, 3424.
31. "[The improvements] belong to the owner of the ground when they are made
without his consent." La. Civ. Code art. 493 xP 1.
32. The landowner has an incentive to consent to the removal of the improvements
since he is otherwise "bound" to keep them and reimburse the good-faith possessor. See
La. Civ. Code art. 496. The landowner has no such obligation to the bad-faith possessor,
unless the owner so chooses. See La. Civ. Code art. 497.
33. La. Civ. Code art. 496.
34. Id.
35. Concededly, the reimbursement may amount to zero if, for instance, the landowner
opts to pay the "enhanced value of the immovable" (rather than the original or current
value of the improvements) and offers evidence that the enhanced value is zero. Ultimately,
however, it is a court, not the landowner, who will determine the amount of the enhanced
value.
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Things are more complicated with regard to the bad faith possessor.
Article 497 draws a distinction between separable and inseparable im-
provements. The landowner owes nothing to the bad-faith possessor for
inseparable improvements.16 For separable improvements the landower
has the option of either forcing their removal at the possessor's expense
or keeping them upon the payment of reimbursement. Thus, with regard
to unwanted improvements, the bad-faith possessor is in a position worse
than that of the consensual builder-and for good reason. After all,
the bad-faith possessor knows that he had no right to make any im-
provements. However, the bad-faith possessor may be in a better position
than the consensual builder with regard to those improvements that the
owner elects to keep, since the owner may keep them only on payment
of some form of reimbursement.37 Unjust enrichment is thus avoided.
Comparison with Usufructuaries
Civil Code article 601 provides that "[tihe usufructuary may remove
all improvements he has made, subject to the obligation of restoring
the property to its former condition." 38 In this sense the usufructuary
is treated like other consensual builders, such as the 493 builder and
the 495 builder, and in any event better than he was treated by the
1870 Code which prohibited him from removing improvements.39 In fact
it seems that now the usufructuary may unilaterally remove even im-
provements made without the consent of the owner; 40 if this is true, he
is also treated better than possessors.4 '
However, with regard to the right of reimbursement for improve-
ments that are not or cannot be removed, the usufructuary is treated
36. The bad-faith possessor may still be entitled to reimbursement if, as in the case
of a drainage ditch, the improvement qualifies as a "necessary [expense] incurred for the
preservation of the thing." La. Civ. Code art. 527.
37. See supra note 35.
38. The full text of article 601 reads as follows: "The usufructuary may remove all
improvements he has made, subject to the obligation of restoring the property to its
former condition. He may not claim compensation from the owner for improvements that
he does not remove or that cannot be removed."
39. See arts. 569 2 and 594 2 (as they appeared prior to their repeal by 1976
La. Acts, No. 103 § 7).
40. This argument finds support in the unqualified language of art. 601, "all im-
provements he has made," and an a contrario reading of art. 602 which, with regard to
the set-off right of the usufructuary, does distinguish between improvements made with
and those made without the owner's consent. See infra text accompanying note 44. While
it is true that article 558 prohibits the usufructuary from niaking improvements without
the consent of the owner or of the proper court, neither this article nor any other article
provides that the sanction for violating the prohibition is forfeiture of the improvements.
More likely, such a violation would probably constitute an abuse of the usufruct (see
article 623) which may lead to termination of the usufruct by the court, if the owner
choses to file a petition asking for such relief. See La. Civ. Code art. 624.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 31 and 32.
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like the 493 builder and unlike the 495 builder: In keeping with the old
law, 42 the second sentence of article 601 denies such a right to the
usufructuary. 4 But the usufructuary is given a limited protection denied
to the 493 builder: Article 602 provides that "[tihe usufructuary may
set off against damages due to the owner . . . the value of improvements
that cannot be removed, provided they were made in accordance with
Article 558," i.e., with the consent of the owner or of the competent
court. Conversely, the usufructuary has no set-off right for improvements
which are separable, or for improvements which, whether separable or
not, were made without consent."
Comparison with Other Precarious Possessors Who Make
Improvements Without the Owner's Consent
Precarious possessors possess the immovable with the owner's con-
sent. 45 Whether consent to possess encompasses a consent to make
improvements depends on the intent of the parties. Since consent to
make improvements need not be in writing or express, the precarious
possessor may in many cases be able to show an implied consent to
make improvements. If so, his rights will be governed by new article
493 or 495, depending on the nature of the improvements. If such
implied consent cannot be shown, the improvements "belong to the
owner of the ground '"46 and the builder is relegated to the "following
provisions, ' 47 i.e., articles 495, 496, and 497. However, none of these
articles is directly applicable to this admittedly small category of builders.
Article 495 is inapplicable because its own terms limit it to improvements
made with the landowner's consent, and articles 496 and 497 are in-
applicable because they are both limited to possessors rather than pre-
carious possessors. The latter two articles may of course be applied by
analogy, but the choice between which of the two to apply is not an
easy one. Applying article 496 would result in treating non-consensual
builders better than consensual builders.4 The same would be true if
one were to resort to the principle of unjust enrichment, which was
apparently disregarded in the drafting of new article 493.49 Thus, the
application of article 497 by analogy is the only remaining solution,
42. See La. Civ. Code art. 594 1 (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1976 La.
Acts, No. 103).
43. See supra note 38.
44. See La. Civ. Code art. 602, comment.
45. La. Civ. Code art. 3437.
46. See supra note 31.
47. La. Civ. Code art. 493 3 (now appearing as new article 493.2).
48. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35 (comparing the rights of the good-faith
possessor with those of the consensual builder).
49. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
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though it too is not without problems. 0 This apparent gap would not
exist if articles 496 and 497 were drafted in terms of improvements
made in good or bad faith rather than in terms of improvements made
by possessors in good or in bad faith. To be sure, this approach would
entail a marked change of approach to, if not an outright change of,
the law of accession, the ramification of which cannot be assessed here.
But it would have at least one beneficial side effect on a seemingly
unrelated front: as explained in more detail elsewhere,5 in order to
qualify as a possessor in good faith for purposes of accession, a builder
must have a title describing the land on which he makes the improve-
ments.5 2 Thus a person who, as a result of an honest mistake caused
by an erroneous description in his title, or a careless reading of the
title, builds a house on the lot of his neighbor is considered in the eyes
of the law a possessor in bad faith, and is treated accordingly under
article 497. This inequity would be avoided if article 496 were redrafted
in the manner suggested above. Be that ai it may, this problem should
not be blamed on the drafters of Act 933 of 1984 or of the 1979
revision, for it has been with us at least since 1825.1
AMENDMENT OF THE LAW OF MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
Act 933 of 1984 also amended the matrimonial regimes provisions
of the Civil Code. To better appreciate these amendments, a brief
overview of the pre-1984 provisions is in order.5 4
Improvements of Separate Property with Community Funds
Civil Code article 2366 read as follows:
If community property has been used for the acquisition, use,
improvement,, or benefit of the separate property of a spouse,
the other spouse is entitled upon termination of the community
to one-half of the amount or value that the community property
had at the time it was used.
50. See supra text accompanying note 37 (comparing the rights of a bad-faith possessor
with those of the consensual builder).
51. See Symeonides, One Hundred Footnotes to the Law of Possession and Acquisitive
Prescription, 44 La. L. Rev. 69, 114-15 (1983).
52. See La. Civ. Code art. 487.
53. See Symeonides, supra note 51, at 114-15.
54. For detailed discussions of these provisions see Riley, Analysis of the 1980 Revision
of the Matrimonial Regimes Law of Louisiana, 26 Loy. L. Rev. 453, 516-21 (1980); Spaht
& Samuels, Equal Management Revisited: 1979 Legislative Modifications of the 1978
Matrimonial Regimes Law, 40 La. L. Rev. 83, 141-43 (1979); Note, Analysis and Inter-
pretation of the New Matrimonial Regimes Law: Termination of the Community, 42 La.
L. Rev. 789, 799-804 (1982).
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The word "improvement" in this article was broad enough to
encompass "buildings, other constructions permanently attached to the
ground, and plantings,"" as well as attachments which became com-
ponent parts under Civil Code articles 465 and 466.16 Thus interpreted,
article 2366 derogated from the general law of accession not only with
regard to the "measure of compensation" as stated in the official
comments5 7 but also with regard to the ownership of the improvements58
during, or at least after the termination of, the community. Unlike the
law of accession, article 2366 provided in effect (though not expressly)
that the improvements belong to the owner of the ground, 9 despite his
presumed consent to making the improvements. Act 933 makes this
explicit by adding the following new paragraph to article 2366:
55. See La. Civ. Code art. 493, quoted supra note 8.
56. See La. Civ. Code art. 495, quoted supra note 16.
57. "This provision establishes a different measure of compensation for improvements
made on separate property than that provided for under the law of accession." La. Civ.
Code art. 2366, comment (a), as enacted by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 1. See article
2367, comment.
58. Stated differently, article 2366 was consistent with the pre-1979 law of accession ac-
cording to which improvements made on the land of another belonged to the landowner. See
La. Civ. Code art. 504 (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1979 Acts, No. 180); Succession of
Spann, 407 So. 2d 441 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981); Deliberto v. Deliberto, 400 So. 2d 1096 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1981); Richard V. Richard, 383 So. 2d 806 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980). These three
cases were decided under the pre-1979 law of matrimonial regimes and accession. Article 2366
has its source in La. R.S. 9:2853 & 2839(3), which were enacted by the ill-fated Act 627 of 1978
(i.e., before the revision of the law of accession in 1979) but were repealed by Act 709 of 1979.
A footnote in Deliberto, 400 So. 2d at 1099 n.3, suggests that "after January 1, 1980... LSA-
CC Art. 491 ... would have permitted the spouses to have established ownership of the family
domicile separate from the husband's land" on which the domicile had been built by community
funds. It is true that, as of the aformentioned date, article 491 permits horizontal divisions of
ownership, and that article 2366, being merely a suppletive provision, would not prevent such
an agreement between spouses. However, in the absence of such an agreement article 2366, being
more specific, would prevail over the more general article 493 or the equally general and non-
dispositive article 491. As explained later, see infra note 59, this result would mean that the im-
provement would belong to the owner of the ground. But see Spaht, Developments in the Law,
1981-1982-Matrimonial Regimes, 43 La. L. Rev. 513, 519-21 (1982).
59. If the landowner-spouse did not acquire ownership of the improvements there would
be no justification for imposing on him the obligation to reimburse the other spouse. It could
be argued that since reimbursement is due only upon termination of the community, ownership
vests in the owner of the ground only upon termination of the community, and that until then
the improvements belong to the community since they were made with the consent of the land-
owner (new article 493 1). If this interpretation is correct, then the new paragraph added to
article 2366 by Act 933, see text following note 58, changes the law by vesting ownership in the
landowner immediately at the time the improvements are made, rather than upon termination
of the community. Even so, the practical effect of such an interpretation would be minimal given
article 491 which provides that, vis-a-vis third parties, improvements on the land of another are
deemed to belong to the landowner unless their separate ownership appears from a document
properly recorded.
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Buildings, other constructions generally attached to the ground,
and plantings made on the separate property of a spouse with
community assets belong to the owner of the ground. Upon
termination of the community, the other spouse is entitled to
one-half of the amount or value that the community assets had
at the time they were used.
The following hypothetical illustrates the operation of both para-
graphs of article 2366. Community funds of $100,000 are used for the
construction of a house on a lot which is the separate property of the
wife. Despite her consent to the building of the house, and in derogation
from the law of accession, the house belongs to the wife. Because of
that, the husband is entitled, upon termination of the community, to
$50,000, i.e., 100 percent of his original contribution, without interest.
His contribution is in effect treated as an "interest-free loan."' 6
Improvements to Community Property with Separate Funds
The same reasoning applies to article 2367, which provided for the
situation converse from that of article 2366, i.e. for improvements to
community property made with the separate funds of one of the spouses. 6'
Act 933 adds a new paragraph to article 2367 and makes explicit what
was implicit in the pre-1984 text, namely that the improvements belong
to the community. 62 The new paragraph also duplicates the reimburse-
ment provisions of the first paragraph of the article. According to both
provisions, if a spouse used $100,000 of his separate funds to build a
house on land belonging to the community, he would be entitled to a
reimbursement of $50,000 upon termination of the community. More-
over, because the house and the land belong to the community, the
60. La. Civ. Code art. 2364, comment (d). See Riley, supra note 54, at 518-21; Spaht
& Samuel, supra note 54, at 141-42.
61. Article 2367 read as follows:
If separate property of a spouse has been used for the acquisition, use,
improvement, or benefit of community property, that spouse, upon termination
of the community, is entitled to one-half of the amount used or one-half of
the value that the property had at the time it was used if there are community
assets from which reimbursement may be made.
See also La. Civ. Code art. 2368 (dealing with improvements of separate property
caused by the uncompensated common labor of both spouses). This article is not affected
by Act 933.
62. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. The new paragraph reads as follows:
Buildings, other constructions permanently attached to the ground, and plant-
ings made on community property with the separate assets of a spouse become
community property. Upon termination of the community, the spouse whose
assets were used is entitled to one-half of the amount or value that the separate
assets had at the time they were used if there are community assets from which
reimbursement may be made.
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same spouse would be entitled to one-half of the value of both. Thus,
this spouse eventually gets 100 percent of his original contribution and,
unlike the husband in the previous hypothetical, 63 participates equally
with the other spouse in the appreciation or depreciation of the value
of the house over the years.
Improvements of Separate Property of One Spouse with Separate
Funds of the Other
Until 1984, the Civil Code's provisions on matrimonial regimes did
not expressly deal with improvements on separate property of one spouse
made with separate funds of the other. Thus a case like Babin64 had
to be decided under the general law of accession, which, as shown
earlier, was also inconclusive. 6 Act 933 fills the gap by enacting new
article 2367.1, which reads as follows:
Buildings, other constructions permanently attached to the ground,
and plantings made on the land of a spouse with the separate
assets of the other spouse belong to the owner of the ground.
Upon alienation of the land, legal separation, or termination of
the marriage, the spouse whose assets were used is entitled to
reimbursement of the amount or value that the assets had at
the time they were used.
The new article derogates from the law of accession by vesting
ownership of the improvements in the spouse who owns the ground
rather than the one whose funds were used. 66 In so providing, article
2367.1 is consistent with articles 2366 and 2367 which, since 1979, also
derogated from the law of accession "in light of the special relationship
between the spouses." ' 67 In this respect the new article promotes certainty
of title and eliminates the uneconomical and often unrealistic option of
removing the improvements either voluntarily or forcibly. 6
The new article is also consistent with articles 2366 and 2367 in
carrying forward the concept of the "interest-free loan ' 69 by fixing the
measure of reimbursement at the "amount or value that the assets had
at the time they were used." ' 70 Thus the spouse whose funds were used
63. See supra text accompanying note 59.
64. 433 So. 2d 225 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
65. See supra notes 7, 11 & 14 and accompanying text.
66. Cf. article 493 1, quoted supra note 8. See also new article 493 3.
67. La. Civ. Code art. 2367.1, comment (e). See La. Civ. Code arts. 2366, comment
(a) and 2367, comment.
68. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 60.
70. La. Civ. Code art. 2367.1; cf. La. Civ. Code arts. 2366-67. Comment (d) under
new article 2367.1 provides that the sentence of the article quoted in the text
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loses not only the interest but also the amount by which the property
has appreciated over the years. Consistency, of course, is not a virtue
in itself. In an inflationary economy, new article 2367.1 as well as article
2366 may be particularly harsh on the builder-spouse. 7' Nevertheless,
given the limited mandate of the drafters of Act 933, any criticism of
the doctrine of the "interest-free loan" would more appropriately be
addressed to the drafters of Act 709 of 1979, which revised the entire
law of matrimonial regimes and set forth the basic policy decisions.
Aside from this problem, the removal of this last interspousal problem
from the scope of the articles on accession represents a major step in
the right direction. Indeed, none of the accession articles discussed earlier
would result in better treatment of the builder-spouse. Treating him as
a good-faith possessor would not result in more generous reimbursement,
because article 496 allows the landowner to choose the lowest of the
three measures of reimbursement provided therein;7 2 treating him as a
bad-faith possessor would not only be doctrinally unsound, but would
also result in reimbursement only for those separable improvements that
the landowner elects to keep. 73 And applying new article 493 would
mean that he would face the possibility of not receiving any reimburse-
ment if he could not remove the improvements within 90 days. 74
Under article 2367.1, reimbursement is due "upon alienation of the
land, legal separation or termination of the marriage, ' 75 whereas under
articles 2366 and 2367 reimbursement is due "upon termination of the
community." The difference arises from the fact that, unlike the other
two articles, article 2367.1 contemplates situations where there may be
no community at all, or where the community encompasses neither the
land nor the funds used for its improvement.
Finally, Act 933 adds another new article which reads as follows:
reflects the general principle established in Civil Code Articles 2366, 2367 and
2368 (Rev. 1979). During marriage, or prior to the alienation of the improved
property, the spouse whose funds were used to improve it has the use of that
property; therefore, reimbursement is limited to the value of that his separate
assets had at the time they were used.
However, at least in cases not involving the family home, the builder-spouse may or
may not "have the use" of the improved property. The doctrine of the "interest-free
loan" must, therefore, find its justification in broader considerations, such as the presumed
donative intent of the builder-spouse.
71. On the other hand, the article may be equally harsh on the landowner-spouse
should the property depreciate, or the improvement be destroyed.
72. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
74. See new article 493 2.
75. According to comment (c) under 2367.1, a "spouse does not have the right to
reimbursement at any other time, unless, of course, he has reserved that right under a
contract with the other spouse."
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Art. 2367.2.
When a spouse with his own separate assets incorporates in
or attaches to a separate immovable of the other spouse things
that become component parts under Articles 465 and 466, Article
2367.1 applies.
Before the enactment of this new article, the improvements specified
therein would be governed by Civil Code article 495, which differs from
the new article in allowing voluntary or forcible removal of the im-
provements. 76 Such removal is no longer possible. The same solution
was already provided in articles 2366 and 2367 for the situations specified
therein. 77 The cross-reference to article 2367.1 contained in article 2367.2
also means that the reimbursement now available to the builder-spouse
consists of the original cost of the improvements, rather than their
current value or the enhanced value of the immovable, as would be the
case under article 495.
IN LIEU OF CONCLUSIONS
The following chart depicts, with some oversimplification, the current
scheme of the Civil Code pertaining to improvements made by one
person on an immovable of another. Because of the oversimplification,
the chart should be read with appropriate caution and with reference
to the text of this article.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
77. See supra text accompanying note 56.
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IMPROVEMENTS ON ANOTHER'S IMMOVABLE
New Art. 493
para. I first
sentence, and para. 2
New Art. 493.1
and Art. 495
New Art. 493 para. 1, second sentence,
and New Art. 493.2
Art. 496 Art. 497
Type of buildings, other component any type any type any type
improvements construction parts of Arts.
and plantings 465 and 466
Status of "builder" precarious precarious possessor in possessor in precarious
and relationship possessor possessor good faith bad faith possessor
to the landowner
Consent of landowner
to the making yes yes no no no
of improvements
Ownership of builder landowner landowner landowner landowner
improvements
Builder's right to
remove improvements yes yes no no no
Landowner's right to
keep if builder wants no no yes yes yes
to remove
Landowner's right to
force removal yes yes no yes yes
Reimbursement, if
builder does not remove no yes yes sep- insep-
and landowner arable: arable: ??*
elects to keep yes no
Type of reimbursement none "current value" "original cost" "current none
or "enhanced or "current value" ??*
value" value" or or
"enhanced "enhanced
value" value"
*See pertinent discussion in text accompanying notes 47-50 supra
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IMPROVEMENTS ON ANOTHER'S IMMOVABLE
Arts. 558, 601, 602 New and Old Art. 2366 New and Old Art. 2367 New Art. 2367.1 New Art. 2367.2
any type any type any type buildings, other component parts of
constructions, or arts. 465 & 466
plantings
usufructuary community spouse in spouse spouse
community
yes no irrelevant irrelvant irrelevant irrelevant
usufructuary naked landowner landowner landowner landowner
owner
yes yes?** no no no no
no yes?** yes yes yes yes
no yes no no no no
no, but set no yes yes yes yes
off
set off; none original "amount original "amount original "amount original "amount
"value" of or value" or value" or value" or value"
improve-
ments
1984]

